HAPPY NEW YEAR PERSIAN GULF

Well, this is one way to create American jobs.

Funny thing is that neither Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, or the U.A.E. would do a thing if attacked by Iran. They'd ask the Americans to do the work for them. So I guess these kind of deals are just the cost of protection.

Muqawama on Iran

Oh, what the hell. Let's outsource this one: here is Abu Muqawama on Iran.

Frankly, I agree with Muqawama when he says:

. . . it's tough to explain how, exactly, a nuclear Iran would be that much more dangerous than a non-nuclear Iran. I am not saying it would not be more dangerous -- I am saying it is very hard to explain how, exactly, a nuclear Iran would be more dangerous. And I think those arguing for war with Iran have an obligation to sketch out those specifics to both policy makers and to the public.

Agreed. A nuclear Iran--adding the possibility that they even went as far ahead as making a bomb that fit onto a missile--would be the most useless thing in Iran, beyond psychological reasons. The regime will not commit national suicide; they will not do something that will cause their theocratic government to fall. And that, for example, would be even threatening to use nuclear weapons. So let's deem a few Iranian nukes as a deterrent, call it a day (because we can't really doing anything meaningful to stop them here in the West) and wait for the Iranian youth to overthrow the government . . . because it's only a matter of time.

Iraq the unraveling (UPDATED)

Thank you Tom Ricks, over at The Best Defence, for the appropriate title for this blog post. (He indeed uses "Iraq the unraveling" in a whole series . . . that's up to Jesus-only-knows how many.)

So what this post is about is The News that Shia cleric Moktada al-Sadr has called for elections in Iraq. Sadr is a key supporter to the Maliki's Shia-led government . . . and with recent arrest warrant against the Sunni vice president (who is now hiding in Iraqi Kurdistan) the day after the American troop pullout, the conditions are most ripe for the unraveling.

Here's my comment: I'm finishing up my book right now, Surfing the Middle East, and just glanced over a paragraph I wrote about Lebanon:

In Lebanon in particular, these tensions are inflamed by the governmental system—where each sect is appointed different access to the political power, reinforcing sectarian identity and taking away from the sense of being Lebanese.

Of course Iraq does not define political power by sect . . . but the lesson still stands: Don't allow the governmental system--that reads great in some Western-published essay on "power sharing"--turn into the very force that reinforces sectarianism.

The challenge for Iraq's democracy will be to maintain what's left of Iraqi identity while avoiding dictatorship.


UPDATE: How to Save Iraq From Civil War was an interesting "counter Dawa" opinion piece in the New York Times today. Worth a read, if for no other reason to hear what the opposing voices are saying in Iraq. (And read it while you can, because if Iraq falls back into dictatorship, I would imagine that these sort of op-eds would cease . . . along with the people who write them.)

A Conclusion (if there are any)

In going through the fact-checking process on my book, I've come to a conclusion while going over the Saba and Shatila massacre:

There is nothing innate in Westerners or Middle Easteners that makes for a more "violent people." Rather, it's the surroundings; the situation that brings out whatever shade in human nature. Everyone is capable of everything.