Frankly, I agree with Muqawama when he says:
. . . it's tough to explain how, exactly, a nuclear Iran would be that much more dangerous than a non-nuclear Iran. I am not saying it would not be more dangerous -- I am saying it is very hard to explain how, exactly, a nuclear Iran would be more dangerous. And I think those arguing for war with Iran have an obligation to sketch out those specifics to both policy makers and to the public.
Agreed. A nuclear Iran--adding the possibility that they even went as far ahead as making a bomb that fit onto a missile--would be the most useless thing in Iran, beyond psychological reasons. The regime will not commit national suicide; they will not do something that will cause their theocratic government to fall. And that, for example, would be even threatening to use nuclear weapons. So let's deem a few Iranian nukes as a deterrent, call it a day (because we can't really doing anything meaningful to stop them here in the West) and wait for the Iranian youth to overthrow the government . . . because it's only a matter of time.
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