Operation Cast Lead: an untold Israeli desire to control Greater Israel?

Has anyone seen the new John Mearsheimer article in The American Conservative? Wow; Mearsh definitely gets the puck-rock award in American scholarship for this one. In Another War, Another Defeat, Mearsheimer takes a bold, clear and certainly non-conventional approach to arguing why Israel didn’t win in Gaza. Thank God for tenure.

I'll let you read the article for your self; it's worth it. But I want to wet your chops with what I found to be the most interesting part. In Mearsheimer’s analysis, he starts by examining the macro reason for the war in Gaza. Not rockets, but an Israeli vice that he calls the desire to control "Greater Israel." Mearsh claims:

"Specifically, Israel’s leaders remain determined to control all of what used to be known as Mandate Palestine, which includes Gaza and the West Bank."

"The key to achieving this is to inflict massive pain on the Palestinians so that they come to accept the fact that they are a defeated people and that Israel will be largely responsible for controlling their future. This strategy, which was first articulated by Ze’ev Jabotinsky in the 1920s and has heavily influenced Israeli policy since 1948, is commonly referred to as the “Iron Wall.” What has been happening in Gaza is fully consistent with this strategy."

I think you can agree that Mearsh is making quite the statement. And, it is at this is a point that I think we need to break down Operation Cast Lead (2009 Gaza War) into two main scopes of analysis: tactics and strategy.

From a tactical point of view, the operation was a mixed bag. On one hand, Israel was able to move its infantry into downtown Gaza City, while only experiencing minimal casualties. This clearly boosted the IDF's status. But on the other hand, Hamas--like Hezbollah in 2006--was able to keep firing rockets into Israel until it deemed it was time to stop. (Note that Hezbollah had much better rockets and ability to hit/slow the IDF incursion.)

On the strategic side of things, however, I would have to say that Operation Cast Lead was a failure. It did not break the will of the people in Gaza, nor did it noose the rein of Hamas--although you could hear harmonized singing from the gallows.

It is at this crossroad that I find myself tortuously confused and perplexed. Israel did not fully crush Hamas, or its ability to fire rockets. But for the people in Gaza, public opinion polls reflect that the Palestinians are still as committed as ever.

So has this whole Ze’ev Jabotinsky strategy--break them until they become subservient--really worked? While Gaza may have been physically broken, its moral is still high and thus hard for Israel to control. At the end of the day, it seems that Israel won a tactical victory, but suffered a strategic loss.

This is why Mearsheimer said that Operation Cast Lead was a failure, because he suggests that the root of the conflict is an untold Israeli desire to control Greater Israel. According to Ze'ev Jabotinsky's theory (control through domination), Israel can only emerged victorious, in this type of conflict, if it finds its self in a greater position of control.

Interesting theory; I think I'm going to need some time to see if I believe it.

The Iran-al Qaeda jig

Conventional wisdom says that Iran and al-Qaeda are different. The former is a Shia influenced theocratic state, while the latter is a Sunni-driven international terrorist organization that is attracted to local conflicts. Different right?

One thing they do have in common is that they are on America's shit-list. While this may not seem like enough to mend a relationship between a few crazies, allow this article to dissect it for you--as requested by the Rooster.

Drunk with adventure: why the U.S. lost Iraq

So yesterday I discovered that for 1.99 you can buy a Dan Rather episode on itunes. I've always respected Rather's reporting and I think that he has crafted a style of balanced journalism.

Last night I got around to watching The Real Iraq. In this program, there are three young looking (late 20's) veterans from Iraq sitting around a table, sharing their experiences with the war effort. I can't exactly explain why, but I felt sicked by the interview and had to close my laptop in disgust. Off the top of my head, here are some of the reasons why:

1. The people on the program seemed unworthy for Mesopotamia. This is the place were humanity learned how to write and yet these people were talking about it like it was some thrill seaking amusement park. In a country that could be its own museum, were non-specialists who seemed only to be involved because of their youthful thirst for adventure and lack of bar stories.

2. They were not, and still don't seem like Arabist. Rory Stewart, who has a very critical outlook on Western involvement in nationalist Muslims countries, was really put into context for me here. In his book, The Prince of the Marshes, he explains that when the British had control of Iraq, they employed such people as Lawrence of Arabia or Gertrude Bell--both were dedicated Arabists, not the so-called 1-year diehards.

3. The ego; the ego; the ego. The pompous ego of accomplishment was almost too much bare. These kids--not much older than myself-- profess that they know something about Iraq, when one of the men being interviewed admitted that his Iraqi education was from an out-dated text from the State Department.

Enough to make me sick? Enough to drive me crazy. Sending Manhattan based investment bankers, turned Arab adventurists to Iraq is only the latest showing of incompetence for the Bush administration. And I don't care if the State Department reads this and it doesn't look good on my background check, when I am serious about doing something, I employ the best.

It's too bad W. didn't get the memo.

Jeffery Goldberg V.S. John J. Mearsheimer

I'm not one for celebrity glitz, but I certainly remember the Biggie Smalls and Tupac Shakur rivalry. These famed rappers taunted each other in their work, stared at name-calling, and even figured out that they could boost their own careers by keeping up the tension. I bring up these rap artists because I was reminded of them this week by the quarreling between University of Chicago's John J. Mearsheimer and Atlantic Monthly's Jeffery Goldberg.

Unlike most of the internet yahoo's with blogs, I have read--and enjoyed--both of these accomplished writer’s books. They are both well spoken and I certainly never would have expected to see such a clash.

But in the age of "bling" and encouraged controversy, it seems that both Mearsheimer and Goldberg are getting a boost for slamming each other—blog style.

Examples? Goldberg just put up a blog post titled "Sheikh Hassan Mearsheimer." In theory, this is supposed to link an article that Mearsheimer wrote to Sheikh Hassan Nusrallah (Hezbollah Sec. Gen.). And to make matters worse, al-Manar (the Hezbollah news outlet) just reprinted Mearsheimer's piece.

In a more academically gloried counterattack, Mearsheimer writes on his blog, with its scholarly association of Foreign Policy:

"Over at the Atlantic Web site, Ross Douthat and Jeffrey Goldberg have been giving each other high-fives after an apparent competition to distort what I write."

"To be frank, it's hard for me to take Goldberg seriously when he writes on Middle East issues. After all, he wrote a 12,000 word review of our book on the Israel lobby that managed to misrepresent its arguments on virtually every page. "

So personal vendettas? Na, don’t think so. Serious attempt to discredit each others work? Perhaps. Personally bashing each other, as they simultaneously boost the others ratings/careers? Absolutely!

As a high school dropout, lover of the news, and virtual pervert of Middle Eastern politics, I have to say that this has been one of the most interesting things I've ever seen.

Since when have those boys at the University of Chicago and the Atlantic resorted to rap wars?

What to do about Iran: Baluchi insurgents or invite them for tea?

A few days ago I posted President Obama's three goals for the Middle East. One of the goals is to address the prospect of nuclear Iran. As feedback to this policy, I made the recommendation that Obama should also take into consideration Iran’s first-rate terrorist apparatus.

A "comrade guerrilla" (aka frind of mine) brought up--in one of the more interesting comments I have received on The Casbah this year— that he thinks the U.S. should step up its support for Iranian internal dissidence groups. To be specific, he talked about a Baluchi guerrilla leader named Abdulmalik Rigi. And just in case you’re a bit hazy on who this dude is, allow me to refresh: this is one gutsy dude who has openly bragged about killing "cowardly" Iranian soldiers and has recently posted a video on a Pakistani website articulating his personal manifesto on insurgency.

I mean he sounds like quite the catch. Even Dan Rather--who I have been invited over to my friend’s house tonight to watch his special on Abdulmalik Rigi—seems to be allured by his staunch opposition to the Shia-style theocratic state. And if I did not know more about Iran, I might almost take a serious look at Abdulmalik Rigi as a true asset for American foreign policy.

The truth is that the CIA, along with Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) has been running a campaign of internal dissidence in Iran for sometime. Seymour Hersh wrote about this in an edition of the New Yorker last year. And in the article, Iranian expert (and once Professor at the University of San Diego) Vali Nazr was quoted in some length.

Dr. Nasr says: "Minority groups that the U.S. is reaching out to are either well integrated or small and marginal, without much influence on the government or much ability to present a political challenge.” Dr. Nasr goes on to say that this tactic will likely “backfire, and alienate the majority of the population,” thus allowing the mullah’s to consolidate their power by spinning the same old anti-Western rhetoric famed in the revolution of 1979.

To me, this has been a major problem for U.S. policy maker’s vis-à-vis Iran. The U.S has bet on guerrilla leaders, like Abdulmalik Rigi, who hold little meaningful and grassroots support. Even a conservative Persian cleric, hardened by his time in the slums and his Qom based Islamic education, would cringe to the idea of supporting a Sunni Baluchi like Rigi.

What the U.S should do--and what President Obama seems to favor--is working with pragmatic, and institutionalized Iranian leaders. People like former President Khatami, who favored a better relationship with the West—who even suggested shelfing Iran's support for terrorist's goups for a lift of international sanctions.

While this so-called grand bargain is much more complex than I am about to get into, it is on the right track. Whether the U.S. likes to admit it or not, the mullah's of Iran have a strong grip on the country. But this isn’t to say that there aren’t leaders who are willing to talk. (Double negative for a reason)

I'm not a genius, but I can see that the U.S is in a cold war with Iran. To make a major break through would not just open a door in Tehran, but also in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories.

This is why supporting a marginalized Baluchi insurgent is a bad idea. It will likely backfire and allow the ruling elite to further there psychological, anti-Western spin that is the post-modern glue for their power.

Comments?

So what is the plan in Afghanistan?

Confused about Afghanistan? Well, your not alone. The Small Wars Journal (SWJ) recently posted an editorial to address this very issue.

The piece is called: Aligning a Counterinsurgency Strategy for Afghanistan by Lieutenant Colonel Raymond Millen.

You'll find the Lieutenant stepping back and praising all the developmental, economic and political progress that has been happening in Afghanistan. But when it comes to the biggest problems, Millen claims that "insurgency, warlordism, and the neglect of the local communities" are the three sticking points that have yet to be fully addressed.

abu muqawama spits a little Hezbollah COIN

As you already know, Hezbollah gets a lot of play on The Casbah.

I'm not good at explaining it, but for some reason counterinsurgency (COIN) and guerrilla warfare are uncontrollably alluring to me. This is why I have just finished reading Andrew Exum's (abu muqawama) assessment on the 2006 Lebanon War. The article is called: Hezbollah at War: A Military Assessment.

I don't have much to say at the moment; I'm still letting the tenets of non-conventional warfare marinate in my brain. But I highly recommend reading it.

And if an Abu Guerrilla endorsement isn't enough, allow the following to persuade:

"What should stand out for U.S. military planners
and policymakers as they study the July War is the simple
fact that an army fighting with largely U.S. equipment
and American-style tactics struggled greatly—
or was at the very least perceived to have struggled
greatly—in its conflict with Hizballah. Thus, enemies
of the United States are highly likely to seek to emulate
Hizballah’s preparation, tactics, and performance on
the battlefield. For that reason, U.S. strategists should
attempt to distill from the recent conflict as many military
lessons learned as possible."

BREAKING NEWS: Afghans get deported from Cuba!

Besides trying to fix the banks, boost the economy and deal with two war's that nobody really likes, President Obama broke old W.'s rule by taking off his jacket in the Oval Office. And we all thought John McCain was the maverick...

But what really impressed me about Obama's first day was that he, by executive order, started the process of closing Gitmo.

Gitmo is our detention facility for not-so-nice people we pick up on the battle-field (say, in Afghanistan). It is a place that the Bush Administration has argued is out of the reach of habeas corpus and in a permanent/awkward eclipse of the law. It is a place that no congressional member has constituents. And a place that yields little intelligence on its prisoners, yet continues to remind the world of the Bush Administrations disregard for international law.

If Obama decision to close this so-called resort in Cuba was for the mere reason that it tarnishes the American image, then I think it was worth it. We can't broadcast ethical and social justice to the world when we have our own “enhanced interrogation” center open for business.

Furthermore, the U.S is going to need allies to fix the Banks, Cars and Kabul. This is why closing Gitmo is so important: an easy gesture that costs America little, yet sends Obama's message that "we are the change that we've been waiting for."

Smart move Mr. President.

"...that by the grace of Allah, comrade Obama, and his Nubian army, will usher in a era of socialism and gay marriage."

Ok already! I admit it. The inauguration was enthralling. But still, I was a little surprised. No "ask not" JFK line to remember the whole thing by?

Another thing that I noticed was that the speech sure wasn't a left-wing manifesto. Good; especially if he wants to keep building his so-called ‘coalition of change.’

Bill Maher said on his show Real Time before the election (jokingly of course) "that by the grace of Allah, comrade Obama, and his Nubian army, will usher in a era of socialism and gay marriage." Funny; And I’m sure to great relief of all the conspiracy nuts, it doesn’t seem like it’s going to happen.

I bring all this up for two simple reasons. I wanted a quick laugh; and I wanted to share the following:

"The last poll they conducted, during the fighting in Gaza, does show that 68 percent of Israeli citizens want the new U.S. president to be more involved in the peace process - but it's not at all clear if that's also what Obama wants."

Advising Our Hussein: Obama's 3 goals for the Middle East

Well Barack, my man, your in! How's the seat in the oval office? Need to raise it up a little? Anyway amigo, looked good today and may the force be with you. You truly are Barack--soft power--Obama. Best of luck kiddo, your going to need it.

And America... I think Thomas Friedman said it best in an op-ed right after the election:

“America is surely the only nation that could — in the same decade — go to war against a president named Hussein (Saddam of Iraq), threaten to use force against a country whose most revered religious martyr is named Hussein (Iran) and then elect its own president who’s middle-named Hussein.”

What a place!

So keeping in line with the whole Middle Eastern Casbah thing--I have decided to do a little out-loud thinking on President Obama's 3 policy goals for the Middle East:

Obama Policy # 1: Based on the 67 borders, find a two state solution for Israel and Palestine.

Abu guerilla: Yeah, that would be good. I could not think of a more worthy investment for the world--and for helping to reduce the threat of terrorism--than finding a two-state solution. As the failure of George Bush’s “hands-off” diplomacy has proven, this conflict needs both personal commitment and a fresh breath of pragmatism. Lucky for you a majority of Israelis and Palestinians favor such an agreement. Unlucky for you, well, yeah...

Obama Policy # 2: Address Iran’s nuclear program.

Abu guerilla: Persian theocrats have created a bloated economy that is so hopeless that even last summers record oil prices couldn’t turn around. Moreover, European leaders really want to restore the relationship between the U.S and Europe. So Obama, my man, if you really want to bring some heat to Iran, convince some of those Europeans to enforce some real economic sanctions.

But you got to be wary of limiting Iran's power to strictly their nuclear program. Iran currently does not have a nuclear deterrent (say, against Israel) but they have a first-class terrorist apparatus that has proven its bite. So if you want to confront Iran, why stop at the whole nuclear thing?

Obama Policy #3: Help create an environment in Iraq that allows the U.S to withdraw its troops in a responsible manner.

Abu guerilla: Sounds good. It was a dumb war to begin with—and you called it. Now that Gen. Petraeus has rearmed Sunni militias in the Sons of Iraq program, al-Qaeda in Iraq has suffered great losses. Hence, less violence.

But lets just get real for a second. Iranian backed Islamists--Dawa, SIIC and the Sadderists, control the Shia block. The Kurds are ever more bent on an independent Kurdistan. And the Sunni's are freaked--along with Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan--because they have just watched America hand over secular Iraq to turban wearing, sermon giving, Iranian linked political proxies. Sure you can pull our troops out, but what exactly are we leaving behind?


Just an idea... What about trying to send a bill to the Iranians. After all, Bush gave them there greatest strategic triumph in over four centuries!

Comments?

Barack Obama, The Politics of Disjunction

A few years ago I took a class on the American presidency. The professor was an older man, a refined political scientist who believed in the models he was teaching. One day he went to the while board, uncapped his black pen, and with blistering enthusiasm, illustrated a little something he called: "The Politics of Disjunction."

And because I know that the readership likes nothing more than a little political science on the tail end of their 3-day weekend, I will try to do my best to summarize what I remember from the model. The Politics of Disjunction occurs in a time of peril, a time when the leadership has been identified as being part of the problem, not the solution; hence, an opportunity for new kind of leadership arises that opens doors for those who previously had been deemed unworthy, both in policies and in practice.

Yeah... well, I warned you. And with the help of a Google search, the following presidencies have been considered to be elected as a result of The Politics of Disjunction: Pierce, both the Adams', Hoover, and Jimmy Carter.

So with a just days left until the inauguration, I can just picture my sage-like Professor uncapping his marker, opening to the crisp page of his library kept college text book, and carefully scribing in after the name Jimmy Carter: Barack Obama, The Politics of Disjunction.

Sleepless nights, who neutered Fatah?

While everyone in the world seems to be talking about Hamas, I thought I would take a moment to write about Fatah. This all came right as I was trying to fall asleep last night. Funny how that works, right?

When the dust settles in Gaza, I think we are going to see a lot of articles suggesting that Hamas had to defend its self not just from the Israeli Defense Force, but from Fatah collaborators. Remember the recent Israeli assassinations of Said Siam and Nizar Rayyan? Both of these men belonged to the more sinister parts of the anti-Fatah movement. In the next few weeks we could learn that Palestinians loyal to Fatah gave detailed intelligence to the Israeli Air Force.

If this so-called Fatah collaboration theory proves to be correct, then I think we can make the following assumptions:

1. Hamas sure isn't Hezbollah. Hezbollah has proven to be hard to penetrate as an organization. The Palestinians in the occupied territories have--and perhaps still--are willing to tip-off the Israeli’s for such things as politically motivated assassinations. Kind of a 'duh' right?

2. While tipping off the IDF is nothing new, I personally think that this shows the underlining weakness of Fatah. Over the last ten years various Fatah movements have come together only once. (It was the confirmation of Mahmoud Abbas after Arafat's death.) So Fatah seems to be in real trouble. And perhaps more to the point: they run the risk of looking like Israeli stooges if they try to reassert themselves in Gaza.

So the leaders of Fatah seem to be wedged somewhere between desperation and unemployment. President Abbas is going to have to have an ace up his sleeve if he wants to survive this one.

But the real menace to my nights sleep was the following question: is the root of Fatah's weakness a result of a rich tradition of personal pocket lining or the West's sanctions, that have neutered every effort to empower a functioning, technocratic, legitimate, secular, with defined borders, and durable government?

After a few hours of turning over in my bed, I settled when I realized that the Palestinians would decide this one for themselves soon enough. After all, their election is right around the corner.