If I were in charge, I'd set the following four conditions for Afghanistan:
1. Secure as much of the Civilian population as humanly possible, ASAP. Keep in mind that this is the creed of classic COIN: drive a wedge in between the insurgency and the state. If you want to read some contemporary COIN wisdom that is currently being evaluated for Afghanistan, click here.
2. Secure as much of the Civilian population as humanly possible before the ELECTION. If the powers that be want any kind of democracy to last, or even just be legitimized, then they have to have this election go off with "purple fingers."
3. Agreed, Start where you are strong. Don't go charging in to Kandahar proper unless you already have a record of successes. This means that the U.S. and Co. needs to show that are worth their salt. Show that they can help--I mean prove beyond a reasonable doubt to the Afghans that you are worth it--and then it's time to talk about Kandahar.
4. The second hardest thing, over the next year, is going to be supporting our troops in Afghanistan. In fact, resupplying a unit in Afghanistan is twice as expensive than in Iraq. Can you guess? Yeah, getting stuff to our guy’s sucks. Iran, off limits. Central Asian Republics, they keep closing our bases. Pakistan, the Taliban keep blowing up our convoys. Bummer.
So all and all, COIN in Afghanistan is going to be hard. In fact, many who talk about COIN in Afghanistan are not your traditional COIN-inistia's. They are politicals', and other idealists who do not understand the true task at hand. But nevertheless, rumor has it that the Americans are going try and turn Afghanistan into COINistan. It will be quite the battle.
(And P.S.--the U.S just invited Iran to talk about Afghanistan at the same table!!!!)
4 comments:
It sounds like what you are saying is that Afghanistan is a whole lot different then Iraq.
In your mind was the US "successful" last time around?
Seems as if the goals were achieved. If not, why not?
And, what would need to happen differently this time around to claim success? in fact, what is success?
Afghanistan is different than Iraq. But the classic pillars of COIN still stand.
And while the U.S may have won a tactical victory with the surge--aka turning to a little COIN in Iraq--it was a political defeat. No reconciliation was made. No major breakthroughs where reached.
Success? I think the best way to measure success is when you don't hear about these places in the news. Meaning, that the insurgency has been taken over by a functioning, technocratic state. But this, however, may be a total illusion.
A few ideas:
One, it is my understanding that Manas airbase in Kyrgyzstan was closed in part due to the government feeling we were not living up to our end of the bargain. Could we send in a good bit of foreign aid, and possibly re-open Manas?
Second, we need to work with Pakistan as much as is possible reopen Shabahz air base in Jacobobad. Reopening Karshi-Khanabad in Uzbekistan should also be a priority if the diplomacy exists to accomplish this.
Third, if we are truly looking at the long haul (several years of COIN ops in Afghanistan) it may be worth the effort, money, resources, etc., to establish a supply line from Tajikistan.
Lastly, concerning the surge, I don't even know if a tactical victory could be attributed there. Considering the payoffs to the 1920's Revolutionaries and the cease-fire called by Sadr over the Mahdi militia, the improvements in security could not be directly attributed to the surge. Just my 2 cents.
sgtlejeune,
Good points
1. It is mostly up the Russians. They are the ones who are outbidding us. That is why I though that Obama's offer to trade the missile defense in Europe for Russia joining the coalition on Iran was interesting--cuz Iran, in this context, also means Afghanistan.
2. Yes. Resupply is key.
3. Remember, Ahmed Shah Massoud was a Tajik. The U.S. has good relations some of these dudes, but the overall relations are shifty, at best. Agreed, however.
4. Agreed, again. The Sadderists taking a hit of the water pipe had a lot to do with it. And now, Dawa/Maliki has brought them in to fight the SIIC, or whatever the hell they call themselves now. But what about the U.S putting the Sunnis on payroll? And Mosul? Who knows if "the surge" worked. But some of the ideas sure have seemed to.
Thanks for the comments
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